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Abstract 
The relationship of the civil/non-profit sector and public administration may be examined from several specific aspects, 
but in our opinion these fields may be put into three – relatively – well distinguishable groups. Therefore, the 
relationship of administrative bodies with civil organisations may be identified in a) the creation of administrative 
programs and participation in legislation; b) the provision of public services, and c) the protection of rights. From these 
three this work undertakes to describe in details the aspect of civil participation in program making and legislation, in a 
way that elaborates on the issue from the side of state administration. 
The primary method of this research – due to the shortage of systematic scientific bases – can not be anything else than 
the comprehensive collection of formal institutional facilities provided by Hungarian laws. 
The paper distinguishes those special forms of participation which approach the legislator (a state administrative body 
participating in legislation) directly, and those institutionalised solutions through which the citizen or a particular (civil) 
organisation may influence the content of laws not by approaching the legislator (state administrative body participating 
in legislation), but through another state organisation. 
It can be stated that the Hungarian legal system makes it possible to channel the direct and institutionalised participation 
of civil entities within program- and law-making activities of organs belonging to public administration, expressing 
their interests. Moreover, the Hungarian legal system has introduced developed and sophisticated mechanisms even 
compared to the international legal practice.  
Real deficiencies can be rather detected concerning the material and legal consequencies of different initiatives, the 
frequency of convening various corporate bodies, and mere formal mode of operating the particular mechanisms. 
Furthermore, it makes trouble that the civil/nonprofit sector is strongly „infected” by direct party politics in Hungary: 
there's a large number of pseudo-civil entities and initiatives within the scope of activities of proposal-making, advisory 
and coordinative bodies. A special appearance of the abovementioned difficulties is the lack of strong and effective 
state-civil society joint mechanisms which aggregate and uphold Roma (Gypsy) interests.  
In summary we can draw the conclusion that both the individual segments of civil society, the political culture and also 
the administrative bodies participating in legislation i. e. their representatives must improve to comply with the already 
existing legal framework of statutory instruments.  
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1. Introduction 
Very different standpoints have been developed in the Hungarian literature regarding the features of entities that partly 
fill the territory between the state bodies and the narrower private sphere of the individual, and the boundaries of certain 
spheres (state, market and civil etc.). Many say many from Tamás Sárközy to Éva Kuti, they place the dividing and fault 
lines elsewhere, but all of them agree that the question is very important also from the aspect of the state’s performance 
ability as well. 
Until the middle-end of the 2000s the state received serious critique, saying that the efficiency of the state organisation 
and within that the governmental direction is low because of the hyper proliferation of the background organisations 
and the constant intention aimed at the creation of half-state fake civil organisations (public foundations, public bodies, 
public companies). 
While in the ’90s and 2000s majority of the authors condemned the state overload and the negative effects of the 
mesosphere, saying that it weakens civil activity, the compellingness to self-care, etc., today most of the criticism refers 
to the openly expanding state that draws the public duties to itself. Otherwise, in the latter case it is only that the state – 
recognising that directly or indirectly it is almost a sole financer in many fields – leaves out the local governments and 
for or non-profit organisations from the task fulfilment and financing process. 
Apparently a process – serving parallel and same goals – is going on, in the frames of which the state consciously 
reorganises the legal status and the subsidy system of the organisations of the civil sphere that have potential roles in the 
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fulfilment of public duties.  
 
Civil organisation – at best – creates institutional channel between the society and the state, transmit the society’s needs 
and interests towards the state, on the other hand it forces the state to continuously legitimate itself, and to increase the 
publicity of its operation. Civil society and political state cannot exist without each other, but both try to be superior to 
the other. Even in a way that it expropriates the traditional institutions and classic territory of the other „party”… 
One of the final questions is how far the civil society can go in the participation of (political) decision making? 
According to the general view the presence is desirable and subservient only in the decision preparation phase that 
presents both informal and institutionalised forms.  
 
The popularity of the presently emerging (?) ideas of good governance, as well as their increased legitimacy is due not 
only to governmental effectiveness, but also to the closely related participatory governance. Plural, participative 
democracy provides for the participation of society and economic players, thus civil/non-profit organisations in 
satisfying common social needs – beyond periodic elections and referenda – within the framework of the right to make 
recommendations, to be informed and to object, as well as in several ways within task provision possibilities. This 
starting point – at least for the present – has not been significantly changed by approaches that refer to the increasing 
role of the state or to the newly created needs and demands arising from different crises. 
 
The relationship of the civil/non-profit sector and public administration may be examined from several specific aspects, 
but in our opinion these fields may be put into three – relatively – well distinguishable groups. Therefore, the 
relationship of administrative bodies with civil organisations may be identified in a) the creation of administrative 
programs and participation in legislation; b) the provision of public services, and c) the protection of rights. From these 
three this work undertakes to describe in details the aspect of civil participation in program making and legislation, in a 
way that elaborates on the issue from the side of state administration. 
 
2. Methodology 
The analysis – or systematic presentation – of the consultative, coordinative or advisory, proposer, opinion-shaper 
institutions of public administration is completely missing within Hungarian administrative sciences in spite of the fact 
that in addition to hierarchic and merely market mechanisms several other horizontal, coordinative and service 
providing mechanisms have been established which led to the spread of different autonomous – and usually of low 
efficiency – structures in Hungary. Taking into account that many – if not all – of these entities and mechanisms are 
functioning by significant involvement of different civil (not-for-profit) actors, the main goal of my presentation has to 
be an introduction of the real weight and extent of this “sphere” by collection and systematization of existing forms 
within it.  
 
The primary method of this research – due to the shortage of systematic scientific bases – can not be anything else than 
the comprehensive collection of formal institutional facilities provided by Hungarian laws. This study makes an attempt 
at introducing all the forms appearing in the positive law in Hungary; especially those by which civil/non-profit 
organisations can take part within the preparation of administrative programs and within law-making processes 
weltering within the scope of public administration. 
Secondly, and of course, facts deducible from the texts of laws must be compared with reality, with factual practices of 
administrative organs: the execution of legal provisions sometimes demonstrates “creative” interpretations, moreover 
the very same legal institutions during different periods are implemented with huge variances. 
And finally, as a third aspect, broader approaches to legal and public policy must be involved: the basic features, 
historical processes and the dominant factors de facto determining law-making and the implementation of law in 
Hungary are to be shown. 
 
Our study shall be commenced with the abovementioned aspect of public policy, outlining the most important 
phenomena of the last decades. 
 
3. The Traditional Features of Hungarian Public Administration in Public Policy Approach 
A starting point of this subchapter is that new Central-Eastern-European democracies established after 1989 did not 
build the political system on layered, sophisticated consultation procedures and institutional systems based on wide 
scale social participation, but – almost exclusively – on the Parliament-centred politic formation structures operating on 
the principle of representation. Many  believe that one of the great problems of societies getting out from under a 
dictatorship is that due to the lack of civil society filling in the space between individuals and the state during their 
socialisation, the members of these societies could never naturally learn to incorporate the identification of problems, 
formulation of their interests, exchange their thoughts, the harmonisation of different opinions, due to which the various 
problem-handling methods were not developed, either. From the public policy side it may be stated that in Hungary the 
  
legal and institutional requirements of representative democracy were fulfilled after 1990, but since then no material 
change has happened towards participative democracy; this means that Hungarian democracy ”has frozen into” the level 
of representative democracy.1  
A father tendency, a feature which may be hardly separated from the one mentioned earlier is that the all-time state – 
formed after the transition – imitates, reconstructs and replaces the civil sector through its conscious efforts, by this 
making it weaker. During the analysis of this, it must not be forgotten that in the economic and sociological literature of 
the past one or two decades the state, by undertaking the 'replacement' and 'simulation' of the organisation of market and 
self-regulating social mechanisms and the political organisation of society, it eventually hampers the connection 
between political decision-making mechanisms and the actual fragmentation of the interests of society. 
Based on the main features of public policy/administrative environment it must be stated about Hungary in advance that 
a) due to the traditional 'from top-down' system, a general – and tendency-like – weakness is the lack of democratic 
control, accountability and transparency; b) due to the politicised and instable practice of the reconciliation of interests, 
the quality of the decisions made in the public sector are often insufficient, as is their execution; c) public policy has 
balance problems; the weight and coordination of the relevant players is disproportionate and incalculable due to the 
extreme politicisation, and political predominance characterises the relationship of the political-administrative system 
and society, regardless; d) the final phase of public policy is missing; public policy processes begin but they often do 
not get to the end. There is no evaluation phase and closure.2 Within the scope of the latter evaluation the preliminary 
and subsequent impact studies are determinative, the main goal of which is grounding the decision-making situation of 
the legislator, in so far the analysis expands the pool of factors the consideration of which is – or should be – essential 
for well thought-through, grounded decision.3 In the Hungarian model of public policy decision making – as mentioned 
before – the 'top-down' approach is dominant, in so far as the institutional mechanisms of the involvement of interest 
protection-integrative organisations operate only formally.4 It is inseparable from the latter fact that the traditional 
features of Hungarian political culture are paternalism, intolerance and the transformation of personal relations into 
political ones,5 and last, but not least the presence of corruption phenomena, which may be observed at a degree 
exceeding the average of the surrounding area.6 Among the classic governmental failure phenomena – which is not 
traditionally Hungarian, but may definitely be observed here – the theoretical difficulties of setting and measuring 
public policy goals may be mentioned, as well as influence of strong interest groups, difficulties related to the size and 
complexity of governmental activities, and to the causal interconnection of certain public policy problems.7 
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In the 1990s – after the transition – there was a regrettable shift: during the transition to a market economy, the state 
withdrew from a number of fields, but during this 'abolishment of the state' several tasks could not be exposed to the 
profit-oriented processes of the market. These tasks were usually incorporated to the so-called non-profit sector, which 
was unfortunately mixed up with the civil organisations both legally and practically: 'It often happened that in complete 
sectors only the signboards were repainted, shifted from state to public utility status, while the old structure, the old 
system of operation, state financing and the old 'expert' staff remained.'8 This environment, however, had a weakening 
effect on organised civil society, upholding its – unnecessarily strong – dependant status. 
4. Civil Participation in Program Making and Legislation 
 
4.1. General Questions of Civil Participation in Program Making and Legislation  
 
Among general pre-questions we shall refer to the fact that the narrowly viewed parliamentary section of legislation 
(which is not the subject of this work) and the section in which the contribution of state administration bodies is realised 
differ from each other, and the social organisations’ participatory rights and competences are also different in the two 
phases.9 Furthermore, there are significant differences between contribution to the decree making of state administrative 
bodies and of local governments. 
 
The possible ways of participation may be categorised from several aspects: 
 
Social participation in legislation has legally detailed (institutionalised) forms appearing on the side of the legislator as 
obligation (negotiations, forums, consultations and related basic feedback), as well as forms about which only general 
rules of the legal system may provide a starting point regarding their possible content or limits (organisation of 
demonstrations, requesting expert opinion, establishing an online debate forum, etc.), without having any legal 
minimum regulation about the ‘observation’ and utilisation of such information transmitted to the decision-maker this 
way, and therefore these have been primarily regulated as possibilities of the potential users of these forms (these forms 
are not in focus of this work). 
Among institutions establishing some kind of obligation on the side of the legislator, there are extremely diverse tools 
considering their ‘features and scope’, which show great diversity also regarding the degree and directness of the role 
they play in establishing the content of the final (normative) decision, or regarding the targeted level of decision 
making/legislation (local, national or European). It is worth noting that this work concentrates primarily on the 
institutions of civil cooperation operating at the national level – for the sake of understanding primarily in the state 
administration/local government division. 
 
The literature, in another approach, categorises the tools and techniques of social participation into two big groups, 
distinguishing between traditional techniques and modern techniques. Among the latter ones, for example, the use of 
surveys may be mentioned.10 
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One of the most obvious groupings of available tools (institutional possibilities) is – as mentioned above – the 
traditional division of direct and indirect tools: in this regard the notion of directness means, one the one hand, the 
institutions (typically in bodies) in which the representatives of civil society may express themselves directly and, may 
be able to make some decisions, while, on the other hand, directness may be used also in the sense that the civil 
organisation directly approaches the legislative body (thus in our narrow interpretation, the competent central state 
administrative body or the body of representatives) with its suggestion or opinion. In the latter approach the indirect 
feature also means the influencing of the public administrative legislative body through another legislative body or 
person.  
 
The titles of the chapter and the sub-chapter intentionally do not focus only on the main characteristics and rules of 
participation in the narrowly interpreted legislation, but also wish to mention at least those practices (institutions) 
through which civil/non-profit organisations may perform activities – which may not be transformed into legal 
instruments, but fit into the frameworks of law – influencing the life of the closer/broader community and participate in 
the creation of documents (strategies, concepts, declarations, calls, etc.). Therefore, when for the sake of understanding 
legislation is mentioned, it shall be interpreted – in a broader sense – by taking into account the abovementioned. 
One of the most important pre-questions is how far civil society may go in participation in (political) decision making. 
According to the general (majority) national opinion, its presence is reasonable and desired only in the preparation 
phase of decision making manifesting informal and institutionalised forms.11  
 
Within the analysis of regulations related to legislation, it may be observed that the regulation – especially with regard 
to the issue before us – is still very much diverse.12 Before 1 January 2011, there was no comprehensive act which could 
have attempted to provide unified regulation for the possibilities and procedures of the enforcement of social interests in 
governmental decision-making mechanisms. A unified set of regulations about social participation is still missing; even 
though Act CXXXI of 2010 on social participation in the preparation of laws “implies in its title that we are facing a 
unified regulation, but this is not the case. In addition to this, sets of acts and government decrees contain relevant 
regulations regarding this issue.”13 Judit Tóth noted earlier that ’The scope of tools related to the operation of the 
Government and the Office of the Prime Minister14 is rather diverse. Their common characteristic is that they rarely 
form a unified system, and rather try to find supporters among civilians for the specific realisation of the goals of the 
given government.’15 After reviewing the relevant valid regulations, we may arrive to a similar conclusion. 
 
The significance of this scope of issues is magnified by the fact that in a plural social order more and more interests and 
values are formulated, the channelling of which into governmental decisions is unavoidable in order to uphold social 
peace. However, social participation in governmental decision-making mechanisms shall be legally settled, just like the 
hierarchy of laws. In a rule of law state social participation in legislative procedures is not an optional process 
depending on the attitude and discretion of the power holder. Moreover, in a democracy, especially one of the 
participative type, the institutionalised system of proposing and opinion making shall not only go through quantity 
changes (’more forums, better regulation’), but also quality ones, which means that regarding these, normativity does 
not only mean the obligation to establish and create these institutions, but also ‘making them unavoidable’, thus 
ensuring their development through tools protected by law. 
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To summarize, it may be stated that one tool for alleviating possible political abuses typical in indirect democracy is the 
substantial participation of citizens and their organisations in public administrative decision making (legislation and the 
lawful influencing of individual cases), and the facilitation of this in a constantly “broadening” scope.  
 
In consideration of the before mentioned, that division may be the most obvious which 
 
A) distinguishes those special forms of participation – regulated by law – able to influence legislation which approaches 
the legislator directly (a state administrative body participating in legislation), and 
B) distinguishes those institutionalised solutions through which the citizen or a particular (civil) organisation may 
influence the content of laws not by approaching the legislator (state administrative body participating in legislation), 
but another state organisation.16  
 
4.2. Civil tools in state administration directly influencing the legislator 
 
4.2.1. Direct participation in program making and legislation without membership in bodies 
 
I. Organisation of a national referendum proposal 
Act CCXXXVIII of 2013 on Referendum Proposal, European Citizens' Initiative and Referendum Procedure states that 
the proposal of constituents on setting the date of national referenda may be organised – among others – by associations 
as well, if the given question is connected with the scope of activities set forth in their articles of association.17 
 
 
 
II. Notice of public concern 
A notice of public concern directs attention to some circumstances the fixing or termination of which serves the 
interests of the community or the whole society. For our topic it is extremely important that the notice of public concern 
may contain recommendations for legislation. [Article 141 paragraph (3) of Act XXIX of 2004 on the amendment and 
repeal of certain laws as well as the establishment of certain regulations relating to Hungary’s accession to the European 
Union]. The notion of complaint and notice of public interest, as well as the related deadlines are regulated similarly by 
Act CLXV of 2013 on complaints and notices of public interest to the way they were regulated before. However, there 
is a novelty in the regulation, namely that notices of public interest may be made in the protected electronic system of 
notices of public interest [Article 4 paragraph (1)].  
 
III. Social negotiation and opinions 
The two basic forms of social participation in the preparation of laws, general negotiation and direct negotiation appear 
in Article 7 of Act CXXXI of 2010 on social participation. The scope of the act covers opinion making by natural 
persons and non-state and non-local governmental bodies, organisations about draft laws and concepts of regulations 
grounding draft laws prepared by ministers. [Article 1 paragraph (1)] According to article 5 paragraph (5) of the act – 
with the exception of some laws made in fields listed in an itemised way in paragraph (3) (e.g. draft law on the 
establishment of organisations or institutions) – social negotiation shall be initiated about the draft and reasoning of a) 
acts, b) decrees of government and c) decrees of ministers.  
General negotiation provides for the possibility of giving opinion through the website of the body publishing the 
concepts or draft (in forms obligatory for the body requesting opinion, e.g. by obligatory confirmation or preparation of 
substantial summaries), while the direct negotiation allows the relevant minister to request opinion directly from 
persons and organisations. The primary legal form of direct negotiation is the institution of strategic partnership – 
creating obligations also on the side of the minister – the framework of which is provided by an agreement determining 
several elements.18 Through these agreements, the minister responsible for the preparation of laws may establish close 
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cooperation with those organisations which are ready for mutual cooperation, and which represent wide-scope social 
interests in the preparation of the regulation of the given legal fields, or perform scientific activities in the given legal 
field (hereinafter referred to as strategic partners). A substantive weakness of the regulation is that Article 13 paragraph 
(2) of the act defines only in an exemplificative way – mentioning only some of the possible forms of organisations (e.g. 
registered church, trade union, civil organisation) – with whom such strategic partnership may be established. Another 
specific (and problematic) rule is the one according to which the obligation of the strategic partner is to represent the 
opinion of organisations which are not strategic partners but operate in the given field of law [Article 14 paragraph (1)]. 
In some cases this could mean that the opinion of the ’rival’ organisation operating in the given field should be 
represented fully and credibly. 
Another important rule [Article 14 paragraph (2)] in this area is that in addition to the strategic partners the minister 
responsible for the preparation of the given law may integrate others into the direct negotiation of the relevant draft, and 
upon request it shall provide the possibility for participation in the review of the given law. 
 
However, it shall also be mentioned that the minister responsible for the preparation of laws may resort to other forms 
in addition to the abovementioned two for conducting negotiation (primarily for getting to know the opinion of non-
strategic members).19 It is also important that the abovementioned act allows the legislator to define other opinion-
making and negotiation rights in other laws and legal instruments of state administration.20 
 
 
 
For assessing the real – practical – significance of that legal institution it shall be considered that Article 5 paragraph 
(5) of the act contains a special and often used rule, which states that “The draft of the law shall not be put up for social 
negotiation if exceptional public order requires its urgent approval”. Within the regulation and actual practice of 
national negotiation and review a significant aspect mentioned by literature is the capacity of public administration (in 
so far as with personal, technological and primarily temporal limits, the cautiousness of public administration may be 
easily explained). Therefore, the extension of the examined procedure with guarantee elements shall not result in 
disproportionate burden for state (administrative) organisations, endangering applicability. 
The real legal nature of broadly interpreted social review is shown by certain constitutional requirements related to the 
social players of the preparation of laws. According to the statement of the Constitutional Court made in its Decision 
469/B/1990 CC, if the organisations drafting the laws do not comply with the obligations set forth in the Act on 
Legislation, this violation of obligations in itself shall not be sufficient reason for assessing the unconstitutionality of 
the enacted laws. Such violation of legal regulations about the preparation of laws may only ground the state 
administrative or political responsibility of the legislator.21 As the Constitutional Court expressed in its Decision 
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30/2000 (X. 11.) CC, only those organisations are unavoidable for the legislator which are expressly and specifically 
named in law, which bear consensual or review rights and – due to their role in the democratic decision-making process, 
with regard to the negotiation obligations – they possess public power. If the act does not define expressly and 
specifically those organisations with review rights, but only regulates the review rights of the interested national 
interest-representative organisations in general, the Constitutional Court did not consider the lack of review procedure a 
violation of the rule of law [as later Decision 20/2001 (IV. 12.) CC referred back to this decision].22 This practice has 
not changed significantly after the approval of the Fundamental Law and the new Act on Legislation. 
 
IV. Lobby activities 
It is worth mentioning lobby activities in a separate subsection, with special regard to corruption, which is quite 
significant in Hungary.23 The regulatory activities of ministries, or in a broader concept, governmental legislation, make 
the institutions of the government targets of lobbying. The creation of the topics and target persons of lobbying is 
determined by – in addition to the general structure of the governmental decision-making system – the level of 
development of the institutional system and decision-making processes of the government, achieved in relation to the 
extension of the role taking of the state.24 During the performance of their tasks, civil servants represent a public 
administration which is more open than ever, which maintains wide-scale professional and social relationship networks, 
which detects and reacts on influences coming from society to an increasing degree. The appearance of ‘public policy 
communities’ show that public law players frequently get into contact with each other, realise their common interests 
and act together when formulating their professional needs. Players composing these communities are familiar with the 
elements of public policy institutions and procedures, and know the real significance of factors influencing the public 
policy decision-making mechanism. Moreover, in Hungary it may also be observed that in order to increase the 
efficiency of the enforcement of interests, any decision which forms the conditions and elements of public policy 
procedures may become the subject of lobbying – even if it has distant relations with the given fields and requires 
legislation. These may be budgetary, institution organisational or personal issues (e.g. in some sectoral fields, interest 
groups do not represent strictly professional issues but strive to influence the appointment of executive officers). This is 
an important issue, even though in European countries the strictly centralised management of public administration 
usually significantly keeps away external interest groups from decisions affecting the internal operation of public 
administration.25 
 
 
The aim of the lobby act submitted and approved in 2006 (Act XLIX of 2006 on lobby activities) was to channel the 
influence of business interest on public power (decisions) into legally regulated areas and make them controllable. 
Therefore it did not target all forms of the enforcement of interests, but only those which were performed by 
‘professional’ lobbyists or lobby organisations based on a commission and against remuneration. The linking of strictly 
interpreted civil/non-profit organisations to lobby activities in Hungary is somewhat difficult to understand, because the 
scope of the previous act on lobbying covered only organisations performing lobby activities in a commercial manner 
(based on agreement, for remuneration) – thus did not concern the presentation of interests or arm twisting by 
organisations due to ‘commitment to their members’, ‘belief’, ‘patronage’, or ‘altruism’. Nevertheless several 
organisations which represent interests have operated as associations in Hungary, and – within some limits – it has 
never been prohibited for them to perform some activities in a commercial manner. 
The act was valid for an exceptionally short period of time (only for four years): among the reasons for its failure were 
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the fact that the majority of those representing economic interests favoured the maintenance-support of self-regulation; 
the forcing of common law elements completely different from the Hungarian environment; institutions appeared which 
were not interpretable for Hungarian political, administrative and legal culture; owing to these factors, Hungarian public 
administration went into passive resistance;26 furthermore, there was the quasi lex imperfecta feature of the act, as well 
as the insufficiency of control mechanisms outside of law. Still, the most determinative feature was the narrow 
substantial scope of the act, the fact that it wished to regulate one narrow aspect of the issue – easily eluded by covering 
material interests – at a high level, without listing or at least slightly regulating the other types of influence – extending 
the scope of lobby activities to those, as well. The previous regulation practically did not consider the fact that today 
only those organisations may achieve real results which have serious professional background and resources, and are 
able to keep up with the latest novelties of technological development – in each case through professionally organised 
transmission of information. The regulation considered lobbyists ‘in reality’, approaching the civil servant personally or 
by means of telecommunication, and neglected the more sophisticated, but very much influential, financed forms of 
pressuring [constant pressuring through ‘position papers’ summarising the official opinion, ‘grassroots type lobbying’ 
(when many write on the same topic under their ‘own name’), or certain indirect tools of ‘community relations’ 
improving the consideration of the organisation by the decision-makers were fully excluded from the regulation.].  
It was the failure of the previous lobby act which showed that in certain fields the state cannot intervene with its 
substitutive regulations even in the absence of self-regulation (which has been spreading significantly against central 
regulations): in some social fields, permanent results may be achieved only through the consistent stimulation of self-
regulating mechanisms, which is a slow and delicate solution, but lacks any alternative. This is the reason – partly – 
why the new lobby regulation creates obligatory rules related to the enforcement of interests only on the side of the civil 
servant receiving the lobbyist (by this strengthening the integrity of public administration),27 and otherwise it trusts 
itself to the already established criminal law barriers (e.g. the crime of bribery).28 In Hungary this concept – realising 
social realities – conflicted with the opinion of organisations regarding the previous concept. Thus Amnesty 
International, Greenpeace, the Társaság a Szabadságjogokért (Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, TASZ) and others 
approached the minister of public administration and justice with an open letter in 2012, complaining that after 2010 it 
was not regulated substantively how business associations and business interest groups may influence the possessors of 
public power: ‘Article 19 section b) of Act CXXXI of 2010 on social participation in legislation (hereinafter referred to 
as: SPL) annulled act XLIX of 2000 on lobby activities without replacing it with proper regulations. The possibility of 
strategic partnership ensured in Article 13 of SPL concerns only a narrow field of the enforcement of interests. Through 
strategic partnership, ministries may establish direct relationship with those organisations ready for mutual cooperation 
which represent a wide range of social interests in the preparation of the regulation of the given legal fields, or perform 
scientific activities in the given legal field. This act is far from regulating lobbying properly. It provides exclusively for 
cooperation with the ministries, even though lobbying is more than participation in ministerial level legislation: each 
activity aiming at influencing a public power decision or at the enforcement of interests belongs to the scope of 
lobbying.’29 
 
                                                 
26 
  According to the report of the Justice Service of the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice prepared 
in 2012 the 307 registered lobbyists tried to ‘officially’ influence only 316 (!) state or self-governmental measures 
within four years. E.g. according to the report at the approximately 3,200 local governments the lobbyists approached 
the competent persons only in relation to 30 decisions within four years (!)… 
27 
  Hungary undertook the obligation to establish Codes of Professional Ethics for civil servants and the 
employee protection public order approved by professional public bodies independent from the government. See 
Section 1 of Government Decision 1080/2013. (II. 25.) on the approval of the action plan about the obligations of 
Hungary within the international initiative of the Open Government Partnership. 
28 
  It has been a debated issue in Hungarian public administration at what level and at what depth the 
professional ethical norms enforceable within public service shall be regulated; within the framework of the Magyary 
Zoltán Public Administration Development Program – theoretically – the old approach is getting stronger again, which 
– within legal frameworks – would allow for the wide-scope self-regulation of those concerned. 
29 
  http://tasz.hu/jogallamvedo?page=2 (accessed May 10, 2013). 
  
 
 
In summary it may be stated (and it is confirmed by the letter of TASZ) that in Hungary the notion of lobbying may be 
apprehended in broader context than commercial activities, and may be interpreted and regulated likewise.  
 
4.2.2. Participation in Program Making and Legislation Through Membership in Bodies 
 
4.2.2.1. Consultation 
 
National definition of consultation 
 
In Hungary the broadest concept of consultation has been used in a triple interpretation (or meaning): 
a) one the one hand, the broader meaning includes the most comprehensive forms of social negotiation and review 
[System of National Cooperation (NER), National consultation]; 
b) on the other hand, it includes the legal forms of negotiation and review described earlier; 
c) finally, it still includes the specific, described consultative forums, as well. 
The present sub-chapter uses the third – narrower, more traditional – meaning as its starting point. 
 
General issues of consultation 
 
In relation to consultation, it may be generally stated that grounded decision making, quality governance and legislation 
require discussion with the interested parties, including consultation. Consultation is the involvement of those 
concerned in the procedure of decision making in order to create real social negotiation. In this sense, therefore, the 
definition relates not only to negotiation in the preparatory phase, but also to the unique realisation of the shaping of 
political will, which happens in order to establish the content of the law based on compromise.30 ‘In the long run, social 
peace may be maintained by compromises through the politics of agreements. Governance may be ‘successful and 
good’ only if it takes into account the heterogeneity of those governed.'31  
The significance of consultation is also stressed by the Commission, which published an announcement about 
consultation, supporting the notion that during consultation each of those concerned should be allowed to properly 
express their opinion.32 In most member states of the European Union, separate, permanent forums have been 
established for macro-level consultation which facilitate the continuous relationship between the government and social 
partners and other representatives of interests – without the burden of immediate agreements – and within this they get 
the chance to familiarise themselves with each other’s opinion.33 Beyond the narrow focus of issues related to the world 
of labour, this covers also specific policy issues. In member states, macro level consultations aiming at globally shaping 
the economy and social policy are usually hosted within the institutional frameworks of prestigious, dominant forums.  
Naturally, governmental-civil discussion shall also be part of social discussion. In addition to social partners, the 
representatives of civil organisations ‘shall also be present in the work of the consultative bodies of macro-level 
negotiation of interests’.34 
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Budapest: OFA. 192.  
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KJK-KERSZÖV. 190. 
  
 
 
 
Nevertheless ‘it may be stated that the prestige of consultation is much lower in Hungary than in other member states’.35 
In Hungary the consultative role is often interpreted as of lower value, failure – also in the self-evaluation, self-
assessment of the players; as a synonym of slow marginalisation in substantial – macro level – policy-making. This 
same fact lies in the background of the fact that in Hungary consultation, negotiation, cooperation is basically 
agreement-centred, bargain-oriented. We shall also add that today in Hungary ‘consultation is [often] not the indicator 
or instrument of values, but of relatively quickly changing interests’. A closely related phenomenon (fact) is that while 
in most of the old member states consultation is substantial (ensured by legal guarantees) and constant, in Hungary – 
traditionally – a lower level of regulation and ‘ad hoc’ character is dominant36, a situation intensified by the 
exceptionally infrequent convening of certain forums. 
 
The regulation regarding bodies operating alongside the Government (and ministries and other public administrative 
bodies) is individual: generally the operation of each body is settled by separate law or legal instruments of state 
administration, which contributes to the fact that there is often parallelism or overlaps in their tasks and competences.37 
The functions of bodies operating beside the government are not always possible to separate; sometimes bodies with the 
same tasks operate under different names (e.g. inter-ministerial commissions or councils – see later). The main reason 
for these difficulties is that ‘in Hungary comprehensive, high-level framework regulations about the main types are still 
missing’.38 We do not necessarily agree that the issue should be regulated in more detailed constitutional rules, but it 
seems obvious that a detailed regulation at the level of acts is necessary. The more comprehensive regulation of 
consultative bodies is reasonable because the broadly interpreted governmental consultation goes beyond consultative 
bodies operating beside the government or ministries, and includes macro level forums independent from the 
governments, as well as territorial level mechanisms and specific bodies. 
 
It must also be added that ‘By today a complex system of governmental consultative bodies has been established in all 
modern public administrative systems’.39 However, despite their significance and quantity, the social sciences pay 
relatively little attention to these institutions, having a role in the shaping of governmental decisions, ‘[even though] 
almost invisibly a new sector has emerged, the operation of which is essential for the quality of governmental activities 
and is also important for their transparency.’40  
It should be noted that there is no good name for this system of organisations in Hungarian law.  The expressions 
‘background institutions’, ‘auxiliary organisations’, or ‘consultative organisation’, ‘institutions of social dialogue’, as 
well as ‘proposer-review organisations’ are (may be) imprecise and deceptive, especially because in some cases these – 
very diverse – organisations possess public power-like competences in addition to the narrowly interpreted consultative 
rights. 
 
Therefore it is necessary to scientifically define the various types of these organisations and clarify – in a comparative 
manner – their role in public power decision making (the preparation of laws), and due to the lack of any laws to 
generally regulate their participation in the governmental decision-making system, with regard to their importance (see 
later). 
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Grouping of consultative bodies 
 
For the transparency of governmental consultative41 bodies, they may be grouped according to the following actors:42 
 
 
a) the scope of participating organisations (e.g. delegating member); 
b) their features of civil cooperation; 
c) their method of selecting members; 
d) the legal regulation of the institution; 
e) the features and content of the members’ rights; 
f) the frequency of application; and 
g) the phase or level of governmental activities to which each is related. 
 
Ad a) Types of governmental (state administrative) consultative bodies based on their members 
 
Based on the scope of participating bodies (organisations) Vadál distinguishes between internal consultative bodies of 
governmental activities and external consultative bodies of governmental activities. In the first one, she lists those 
institutions and procedures (e.g. government commissions, cabinets and inter-ministerial commissions), in which only 
state bodies participate and the representatives of civil society (non-state bodies) are usually not present among the 
members. Into the latter grouping she lists those bodies within which, in addition to the representatives of governmental 
bodies, the institutions of the widest range of civil society are present: such as social organisations, representatives of 
interests, professional and expert organisations, representatives of science, professional chambers, etc. Within this 
grouping it is important that ‘through these bodies, the interconnection between governmental activities and the 
activities of organisations interested in and concerned about decisions may be established. Through these bodies, the 
presentation of interests, their collision, striving for consensus, and the professional and scientific grounding of 
decisions may be realised’.43 
 
 
There is another grouping similar to Vadál’s which, as one method of the presentation and enforcement of specific 
aspects of interests – significant in the preparation of governmental decisions – at each level and area of governmental 
activities [partly sectoral (strictly professional) and partly functional (beyond the aspects of certain sectors] which 
a) enforces the given (public policy) interests by establishing an independent coordinative mechanism or body (mainly 
relying on the staff of the state administration), or 
b) introduces the institutional solutions – including external actors – of ‘transmitting information’ related to interests 
‘into governmental activities’.44 
 
 
As has been mentioned before, both types of organisations may be put into the group of so-called governmental 
auxiliary bodies the ‘common feature of which is that part or all of their activities is related to the governmental 
decision-making procedure with the aim that these decisions shall be well-grounded from all – professional, legal and 
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  Balázs, István. 2011. Magyarország közigazgatása. [Hungary’s public administration] In Szamel, Katalin, 
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political – aspects and the delivered decisions shall be used also in reality’.45  
 
Based on the abovementioned facts, it is clear that the two types of organisations are not ‘identical’: while the second – 
theoretically – serves the observation, aggregation of interests and their transmission to the decision-makers, the first 
one performs the channelling of the revealed interests, and the professional preparation of their presentation in the drafts 
of different programs and legal instruments, as well as their negotiation and concretisation within public administration. 
However, the majority of practical difficulties well interpretable from the side of civil society result from the lack of 
regulation and the conflict of existing regulations related to the tasks and composition of these two ‘types of 
organisations’ and their relationship, with regard to the fact that the two types of bodies exist simultaneously. For 
example, the two consultative bodies for the representation and facilitation of the management of Roma issues have 
been established accordingly, but the relationship between the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Social Development and 
Roma Issues46 and the Roma Coordinative Council47 has not been clarified; it is hardly interpretable and less 
transparent, based on government decisions and practical experiences. 
 
This situation is further complicated by the fact that within the internal negotiating mechanisms of state administration 
(at the meeting of the Government performing final coordination, or in different coordinative and consultative 
mechanisms, bodies) the representatives of civil organisations (may) appear directly in several ways. For example – to 
continue with the abovementioned example – according to the Government Decree establishing the Roma Coordinative 
Council ‘[The] Government calls upon the leaders of central state administrative bodies to ensure, in case of laws 
related to the social development of Roma people defined in the legislative program of the Government, the possibility 
to provide opinion for the [civilian and non-civilian] members of the Council within the public administrative 
negotiation’. Furthermore, Section 49 of Government Decree 1144/2010. (VII. 7.) on the rules of procedures of the 
Government must be mentioned, according to which the undersecretary for administration of the Ministry of Public 
Administration and Justice may invite external persons – for example representatives of civil organisations – to the 
meeting of the undersecretary of administration; and its section 59, based on which persons – for example 
representatives of civil organisations – invited personally by the Prime Minister may participate at the meeting of the 
Government.  
 
Ad b) Basic types of governmental (central state administrative) consultative bodies – from the aspect of civil 
cooperation: 
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46 
  Within the scope of the examined field the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Social Development and Roma 
Issues supports those written in section a) herein. The Government established the Inter-Ministerial Committee for 
Social Development and Roma Issues for improving the standard of living and social status of Roma people and those 
living in poverty and for the harmonisation of governmental activities aiming at facilitating their social integration. The 
primary task of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Social Development and Roma Issues – based on Government 
Decision 1199/2010. (IX. 29.) on the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Social Development and 
Roma Issues – is to harmonise activities related to social development, to make recommendations for the Government 
for the harmonised planning of the resource needs of tasks related to the social development and for the supervision of 
finances, as well as to coordinate and evaluate the execution of governmental tasks aimed at improving the standard of 
living and social status of Roma people and those living in poverty and at facilitating their social integration. 
47 
  An institutional realisation of those written in section b) herein (in the examined field) is the Roma 
Coordinative Council established by Government Decision 1102/2011. (IV. 15.) on the establishment of the Roma 
Coordinative Council, which was established by the Government based on social partnership for the establishment and 
execution of measures facilitating the effective development of the Roma population, as well as for rendering an 
opinion about the results. The Roma Coordinative Council is an advisory, consultative body supporting social 
development, and in line with the aims of the Government it is a specific forum for transmitting information related to 
the interests of the concerned social groups into governmental work. 
  
1. bodies ensuring membership-like civil participation48 (mixed system); 
2. bodies composed of the delegates of only (central) state administrative bodies (e.g. Sulinet Expressz Program 
[Internet at Schools Express Programme] Project Council49) – without civil organisational rights; 
3. bodies composed of the delegates of only (central) state administrative bodies – with the possibility of direct 
channelling of civil interests;50 
 
 
4. bodies composed exclusively of experts – without direct and expressed civil participation;51 
 
 
5. no civil member, but civil organisations may make suggestions for the appointment of members (their opinion is 
requested in a formal procedure, e.g. Hungarian Design Council52). 
 
Ad c) Main forms of establishing membership: 
 
1. ministerial request and appointment – without civilian cooperation (e.g. recommendation) before the appointment; 
2. ministerial request and appointment – with the possibility (right) for civilian recommendation; 
3. submission of a declaration of unilateral accession,53 and declaration of will54; 
4. naming a specific civil organisation in a normative source of law (e.g. HUNGARNET Association55, or earlier the 
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  The expression 'civil participation' primarily means those cases when the natural person participating in a 
consultative body is representative of a civil organisation, not in his own name, directly due to his professional expertise 
gained at the given field. 
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  Government Decree 283/2003. (XII. 29.) on the tasks and operational rules of the Sulinet Expressz Program 
Project Council. 
50 
  The president of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Social Development and Roma Issues may invite other 
people – typically representatives of Roma civil organisations – based on the founding legal document. 
51 
  See for example the composition of the Scientific Committee set forth in Article 6 paragraph (1) of 
Government Decree 112/2011 (VII. 4.) on the (…) scientific committee supporting the work of the National Atomic 
Energy Office.  
52 
  For the appointment of the members of the National Design Council (MFT) the president of the National 
Office of Intellectual Property makes a recommendation, for the creation of which he requests the opinion of related 
professional and interest representation organisations [Article 2 paragraph (2) of Government Decree 266/2001 (XII. 
21.) on the Hungarian Design Council]. 
53 
  According to Article 1 of Ministry of Human Resources Decree 50/2012. (XII. 19.) on the National Patient 
Forum any civil organisation may join the section of the National Patient Forum (herein after referred to as: NBF) in 
line with its activities with a declaration of accession sent to the Board of the NBF if the civil organisation operates in 
compliance with act on civil organisations and performs its activities in the field of health care.  
54 
  According to Article 2 paragraphs (1) and (2) of Government Decree 65/2000. (V. 9.) on the establishment 
and detailed rules of the operation of the Charitable Council, the public benefit organisations performing charitable 
tasks which want to become members of the Council may submit a related declaration of intent to the minister – and the 
minister shall automatically provide credentials for the representatives of those organisations which comply with 
conditions set forth in Article 1 paragraph (2) and have submitted their declaration of intent.  
55 
  Section 1 of Government Decision 1129/2013. (III. 14.) on the establishment of the National Information 
Infrastructure Development Program Council and the definition of its rules of procedure the Government established, as 
proposer, review and advisory body the National Information Infrastructure Development Program Council, and its 
section 6 requests – among others – the president of the HUNGARNET Association to participate in the work of the 
Program council as a permanent member. 
  
National Association of Hungarian Artists); 
5. with election based on the candidacy system.  
 
It is important that the abovementioned types do not cover all types operating in practice, with special regard to the fact 
that the mechanisms of selecting (civilian) members and of the establishment of membership are not fixed in each case. 
A practical difficulty which has been mentioned in the literature for a long time is that in institutions (bodies) where 
there are provisions about the selection of civilian members, we usually only find the description of activities the 
performance of which allows organisations to participate, ‘but it is [often] left in the shadow what the exact mechanism 
is for their selection’ and what methods may be used for ensuring the democracy of the procedure.56 This deficient legal 
regulation allows the government (any government, not just the current one) to arbitrarily select from among 
organisations formally complying with all conditions, not necessarily paying attention to their real social significance 
and professional preparedness.  
 
Ad d) Legal regulation of consultative bodies – from the civil point of view: 
 
Open legislation may become counterproductive if ‘the processing of opinions and the feedback procedure are not 
regulated and managed properly’ – says Vadál.57 Mentioning these elements is especially important regarding the 
domestic – external – consultative bodies, because these communication aspects provide the basis of most practical 
difficulties. 
 
Ad e) Rights and tools available for the civilian member or for the body with civilian member: 
 
1. review; 
2. recommendations; 
3. negotiation of interests; 
4. preparation of decisions; 
5. decision making; 
6. coordination; 
7. analysis and evaluation of execution; 
8. lawsuit.58 
 
 
 
Among – public power-like – rights which go beyond traditional consultative rights (the right to information, the right 
to negotiate, the right to make recommendations, the right to give an opinion) those shall be mentioned through which 
decision making power is divided between the public administrative body (typically the Government) and the 
consultative body.59 In such cases the original possessor of the decision making right, who is responsible for decision 
making, cannot deliver the decision on its own, because the concerting right (co-decision making right) of the 
mentioned body limits this. Naturally, in such cases the original possessor of the decision-making right cannot fully 
delegate the right to decision making or its responsibility for the decision (and the liability for its possible 
consequences), but with the self-regulating ‘delegation’ of certain elements of decision making it may ensure substantial 
participation and unavoidable control-possibility to the representatives of the targeted groups. A good – though as yet 
theoretical – example is the Framework Agreement established between the Government of Hungary and the National 
Roma Self-Government [NRSG], based on which ‘Within their cooperation the Government and the NRSG establish a 
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  Vadál (n 9) 162. 
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  The rule defined in Article 25 paragraph (7) of Act XXVI of 1998 on the rights and equal opportunities of 
disabled persons, according to which against those violating the rights of disabled persons defined in law the National 
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  Vadál (n 9)  61. and 86.  
  
draft government decree, in which they define the certain fields of intervention and the participants of the co-decision 
agreement and together with the bodies appointed for co-decision-making define the co-decision-making mechanism 
relevant for the given field, by taking into consideration, and keeping in line with, the valid EU and national procedural 
regulations’. In an exemplificative manner, the Framework Agreement defines those fields in which it wants to give to 
the NRSG effective and substantial rights for the enforcement of interests: ‘The Government establishes the co-decision 
system primarily in the fields of programs aiming at the expansion of employment, increasing standards of education 
and improving standards of living, as well as of scholarship programs, investment and employment supports.’ It is clear, 
therefore, that the decision-making and co-decision-making rights may primarily contain partial rights related to 
tenders, funds, or personal issues, sometimes not in a substantial manner, but ‘only’ in form of veto60 or ‘quasi veto’, 
these latter ones covering the elements which, for example, allow for the postponement of decision-making or the 
suspension of the execution of the delivered decisions.61  
 
Ad g) Types of consultative bodies related to certain governmental levels: 
 
We may distinguish between bodies established beside non-local-governments based on whether they were created by 
the Government or independently from it. The best example for the latter is the National Economic and Social 
Committee established by Act CXIII of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Committee, which was created with 
the aim of discussing comprehensive ideas related to economic and societal development and national strategies 
existing through governmental cycles, and facilitating the elaboration and realisation of harmonised and balanced 
economic growth and the related social models. The Committee was established as a consultative, proposer and 
advisory body independent from the Parliament and the Government, and as the complex and most diverse consultative 
forum of social dialogue between organisations representing employers’ and employees’ interests, economic chambers, 
civil organisations operating in the field of national policy, national and foreign representatives of science, and churches 
defined in a separate act.62 It is worth noting that the solution is not unique in Hungarian legal development.63 It is 
important that independence from the government does not mean that during the activities of the forums, opinions of the 
Government and civil organisations cannot be directly in conflict or that the government cannot be substantially 
‘influenced’ in some ways.64 
 
 
 
In addition to the most comprehensive consultative mechanism(s), consultative bodies operating beside the Government 
and certain central state administrative bodies form a separate category; these partly appear in classic, sectoral fields 
                                                 
60 
  The exclusive recommendation right and the right to initiative, as well as the right to consent and the 
decision bound to a certain voting rate may be considered as such. 
61 
  For details see: Rixer, Ádám. 2013. A roma érdekek megjelenítése a jogalkotásban. [Emergence of Roma 
interests in legislation] Budapest: Patrocinium. 158-160. 
62 
  Article 2 paragraph (1) of Act XCIII of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Council. 
63 
  The Economic and Social Council – which has always operated in an unstructured way and without 
substantial rights – was established in the building of the Parliament on 24 August 2004, and wished to remain a 
professional forum independent from the government and party politics ‘by discussing long-term national, strategic 
issues’. In the Council, national trade unions and employers’ interest representatives, and representatives of chambers, 
investors, civil organisations and science were present as members. The GSZT expressly aimed at being the forum of 
national consensus seeking to rise above everyday political fights. In this institution the different sectors were allowed 
to present their opinions about issues the nation was facing that would determine long-term development. 
64 
  For example, based on Article 153 paragraph (1) of Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code, the Government shall 
receive authorisation to define in decree – after consultation in the National Economic and Social Council – about a) the 
lowest obligatory wage and b) the amount and validity of the guaranteed wage minimum. 
  
(health care, education, social issues, economic issues65, etc.), and partly may be identified as intersectoral fields (e.g. 
see the before mentioned Roma issue).  
 
In addition to consultative bodies operating beside or ‘between’ central state administrative bodies the territorial 
consultative bodies, or bodies with a consultative type of tasks shall be mentioned, the majority of which may be 
characterised as so-called quasi state administrative bodies. These may also be called atypical mixed bodies, in so far as 
they appear neither as fully state administrative, nor fully local-governmental, syndicate types of bodies.66 It is true in 
general that the main reason for their existence is that the presentation of general and local interests, abilities and 
expectations could not be possible or reasonable at the same time at other forums or scenes. These creatures may be 
described as territorial cooperative mechanisms – typically aiming at program making – in so far as they primarily try to 
act as forums for the exchange of opinions and for dialogue between civilians and local-governmental and state 
administrative (types of) bodies. They are usually without organisational independence, but they are usually 
independent in exercising their tasks and competences. Examples of such are the Regional Social Policy Committees or 
the Regional Tourism Boards.  
 
Summary statements and general conclusions in relation to consultation 
 
It is an assumption in legal literature – which goes beyond our specific subject – is that the relationship of the 
established forums for the preparation of decisions and for negotiation, their specific role and significance should be 
clarified in law.67 For a long time the main question has been whether in the case of decision-making mechanisms 
supplemented with mainly informal, ‘customised’ elements, the strictness of the legal regulations (deeper and more 
accountable than today) – and of the transparency and higher level of legal security theoretically achievable by this – 
would impose great difficulties in reaching substantial compromises and using practical ‘quickly reacting’ methods. It 
may be stated that the difference mechanisms aiming at the preparation of decisions should be formalised through more 
detailed legal provisions than today.68 
 
 
Among further difficulties, on the one hand, the low level of professional preparedness and material resources of social 
players (the latter may appear, for example, in relation to the costs of preparing an expert opinion), and, on the other 
hand, as the capacity deficiency of the governmental side, the lack of such civil servant staff – specialised in negotiating 
activities – in central public administration may be mentioned. 
 
4.3. Tools Influencing the Legislator Indirectly, Through Other Bodies 
Here those possibilities will be presented through which the citizen or the civil organisation influences the contents of 
laws enacted by competent public administrative bodies by approaching not the legislator, but another state 
organisation. In some cases, these mechanisms may make the chances of influencing the legislator rather indirect, and 
sometimes – as will be shown – quite distant (through the initiation of the review of the content of the given law, which 
may lead to the annulment of the law or legal regulation by the Constitutional Court).  
Such tools may be, among others, 
1. Constitutional complaint. According to article 24 paragraph (2) section c) of the Fundamental Law, based on the 
constitutional complaint the Constitutional Court – which may be approached also by the civil organisation concerned 
about the given issue – reviews the harmony of the law used in the individual case with the Fundamental Law; 
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2. Initiating the procedure of the parliamentary commissioner for fundamental rights. According to article 24 paragraph 
(2) section e) of the Fundamental Law, upon the initiative of the Government, one-fourth of the members of Parliament, 
the president of the Curia, the Chief Prosecutor or the parliamentary commissioner for fundamental rights, the 
Constitutional Court reviews the harmony of laws with the Fundamental Law within the frameworks of subsequent 
norm control. The related procedure of the parliamentary commissioner of fundamental rights may be initiated by 
anyone, in line with article 30 paragraph (1) of the Fundamental Law. 
 
5. Conclusion 
It can be stated that the Hungarian legal system makes it possible to channel the direct and institutionalised participation 
of civil entities within program- and law-making activities of organs belonging to public administration, expressing 
their interests. Moreover, the Hungarian legal system has introduced developed and sophisticated mechanisms even 
compared to the international legal practice.  
Real deficiencies can be rather detected concerning the material and legal consequencies of different initiatives, the 
frequency of convening various corporate bodies, and mere formal mode of operating the particular mechanisms. 
Furthermore, it makes trouble that the civil/nonprofit sector is strongly „infected” by direct party politics in Hungary: 
there's a large number of pseudo-civil entities and initiatives within the scope of activities of proposal-making, advisory 
and coordinative bodies.  
A special appearance of the abovementioned difficulties is the lack of strong and effective state-civil society joint 
mechanisms which aggregate and uphold Roma (Gypsy) interests.  
 
In summary we can draw the conclusion that both the individual segments of civil society, the political culture and also 
the administrative bodies participating in legislation i. e. their representatives must improve to comply with the already 
existing legal framework of statutory instruments.  
